Highly pathogenic H5 avian influenza in 2016 and early 2017 - observations and future perspectives by Sims, Les et al.
1NO. 11 | NOV 2017
Summary
During 2016–2017 novel strains of highly pathogenic H5 avian influenza virus within 
the Goose/Guangdong/96 (Gs/GD/96)-lineage 
(mainly H5N8) caused multiple outbreaks of 
disease in poultry and wild birds across much 
of Europe, parts of Asia, the Middle East and 
West Africa, and have extended for the first 
time to affect poultry in Eastern and Southern 
Africa. The virus was reported first in the Tyva 
Republic in late May 2016 before being detected 
elsewhere. This was the fourth intercontinental 
wave of transmission by an H5 virus within this 
lineage and was by far the most severe in terms 
of the number of countries affected. 
Observations from earlier intercontinental 
outbreaks of Gs/GD/96-lineage H5 HPAI from 
2005 onwards may help forecast the probable 
course of this current panzootic,1 although it 
also demonstrates that the behaviour of H5 
HPAI viruses in this and previous waves has 
varied. If the reasons for these differences 
can be determined, (viral, host and environ-
mental factors), it may help improve fore-
casting and hence preparedness and early 
detection of viral incursions. In particular, 
the detection of a novel virus in wild birds on 
the Tibetan plateau and surrounding areas 
largely devoid of commercial poultry pro-
duction, (including northern Mongolia and 
southern Russian Federation), in May-June 
of any year is likely to be followed later that 
year by detection of a similar virus in other 
distant countries, extending into Europe, 
South Asia and Africa. 
Evidence from earlier waves also suggests 
that the current virus could return to Europe in 
2017–2018, although the number of outbreaks 
is expected to be lower than in 2016–2017. 
In the current fourth intercontinental wave, 
the virus has been detected in a range of 
farm types, intensive and extensive, with a 
higher proportion in domestic ducks, geese 
and turkeys, but chickens have also been 
affected. Secondary spread between poultry 
farms appears to have occurred in at least 
six European countries: Hungary, France, 
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Bulgaria, Germany, Poland and the United 
Kingdom, (APHA, 2017), but many appear to 
be primary cases not directly related to other 
cases on poultry farms. 
At about same time as the H5N8 virus ap-
peared in Europe an H5N6 subtype virus also 
within the Goose/Guangdong/96-lineage caused 
a massive outbreak of disease in layer chickens 
and ducks in the Republic of Korea. This virus 
has not been detected there since early April 
2017. 
Movement of both viruses has been associ-
ated with infection in wild birds and their role 
in the long distance transmission of these 
viruses during the autumn migration is now 
irrefutable. 
Background
In September 2016 FAO released an EMPRES Watch warning of the likely west-
ward and southerly spread of H5N8 highly 
pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus during 
the northern hemisphere autumn and winter 
of 2016–2017. This warning was based on de-
tection of a novel H5N8 virus in wild birds at 
Lake Ubsu-Nur in the Republic of Tyva, south-
ern Russian Federation, in late May 2016 (see 
Figure 1a, red oval). 
By October 2016, closely related viruses 
were detected in India and Europe and contin-
ued to spread throughout the autumn, winter 
and spring of 2016–2017, eventually affecting 
48 countries by the end of June 2017. In winter 
and spring of 2017 virus detection continued 
to occur across Europe and cases were also 
detected in Nepal, north-eastern China, the 
Republic of Korea and the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo. By May 2017 the number of new 
outbreaks in Europe had fallen dramatically but 
some new cases were still reported in June. 
New cases appeared in Turkey and extended 
eastwards to multiple areas in the Russian 
Federation including the Republic of Tatarstan 
and the Udmurt Republic. The virus spread to 
southern Africa with an outbreak in a breeder 
farm in northern Zimbabwe in late May, and 
multiple farms in South Africa in June 2017.
The 2016–2017 H5N8 viruses acquired 
genes from other low pathogenicity viruses 
circulating in wild birds, resulting in the emer-
gence of multiple reassorted viruses includ-
ing some that incorporated novel N5 or N6 
genes and lost the N8 gene to produce H5N5 
and H5N6 viruses (APHA, 2017). The common 
feature of all of these Gs/GD/96-lineage vi-
ruses is the H gene that can be linked back 
to the first occurrence detected in southern 
China in 1996, the initial virus in the lineage. 
Viruses in this lineage spread widely from 
2003 onwards to more than 60 countries and 
remain endemic to a number of them. 
This Focus On summarises observations 
from the current (fourth) intercontinental 
waves associated with Gs/GD/96-lineage vi-
ruses as well as information on other related 
H5 viruses spreading in 2016–2017. It pro-
vides information on the genetics of these vi-
ruses, some discussion on the likely progress 
of the current intercontinental wave and 
guidance for forecasting future waves. Socio-
economic implications of the global spread 
of H5N8 HPAI, while acknowledged as highly 
important, are not covered in this report and 
will be reviewed separately. 
Clade 2.3.4.4 H5N8 HPAI virus –  
the fourth intercontinental wave
Since May 2016, considerable highly patho- genic avian influenza (HPAI) activity as-
sociated with Goose/Guangdong/96-lineage 
Figure 1a
H5N8 HPAI outbreaks officially reported in Asia, Middle East, Europe and Africa by onset 
date and bird type affected (domestic or wild), between 1 May and 31 December 2016
(Gs/GD/96-lineage) H5 viruses belonging to 
clade2 2.3.4.4 has occurred. These events in-
clude the fourth intercontinental wave involv-
ing an H5N8 HPAI virus, likely associated with 
wild bird movements, as well as incursion of 
another clade 2.3.4.4 (H5N6) virus into the 
Republic of Korea, Japan; (Okamatsu et al., 
2017; Si et al., 2017; Lee, Song et al., 2017) 
and Taiwan Province of China, considered in 
more detail later in the document. A wide 
range of avian species, both captive and wild, 
have been affected by the H5N8 HPAI virus 
(APHA, 2017). 
Early warning of the fourth interconti-
nental wave was provided by the detec-
tion and reporting in June 2016 of a clade 
2.3.4.4 H5N8 virus in wild birds in the south-
ern Russian Federation on the border with 
Mongolia - Lake Ubsu-Nur (FAO, 2016a; Lee, 
Sharsov et al., 2017; Marchenko et al., 2017). 
It is now recognised that a very closely relat-
ed virus was associated with an earlier wild 
bird die-off at Qinghai Lake, China in May 
2016 (Li et al., 2017). Similar viruses have 
2 For Goose/Guangdong/96-lineage (Gs/GD/96-lineage) 
H5 clade nomenclature, please see Smith and Donis, 
2015.
Note: The red oval denotes the first detection of the virus.
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been detected in India (Nagarajan et al., 
2017), across much of the Middle East and 
Europe, and have spread into Africa where 
the extent of transmission is still being es-
tablished. As of 30 June 2017 this virus has 
now been reported by 48 countries – 29 in 
Europe, plus the Russian Federation, Egypt, 
Israel, India, the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
other parts of China, the Republic of Korea, 
Tunisia, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Nepal, Nigeria, 
Niger, Cameroon, Uganda, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Turkey, Zimbabwe and 
South Africa.
 Locations of reported cases in poultry and 
wild birds in the fourth intercontinental wave 
as of 30 June 2017 in this wave are provided 
in Figure 1c. 
Unlike the previous intercontinental wave 
in 2014–2015, a novel Gs/GD/96-lineage virus 
has not been detected in North America in 
this wave. 
In the current fourth wave, the virus has 
been found in a range of intensive and exten-
sive farm production systems and species with 
a higher proportion in domestic ducks, geese 
and turkeys than chickens (on a population 
basis). Hungary, France, Bulgaria, Germany 
and Poland have all reported clusters of cases, 
some considered to be the result of secondary 
spread in poultry. 
Earlier intercontinental HPAI  
waves – similarities and differences
The previous intercontinental waves of in-
fection with Gs/GD/96-lineage H5 viruses 
provide some guidance on possible future 
events. The pattern and timing of H5N8 
HPAI cases in this fourth transcontinental 
wave differ somewhat from those seen in 
the three previous intercontinental waves, 
(2005–2006, 2009–2010 and 2014–2015), de-
scribed in the EMPRES Watch released in 
September (FAO, 2016a). For example, the 
current wave has been more severe than all 
previous waves, in terms of the number of 
wild birds affected as well as affected farms 
and zoological collections, especially in 
Europe. More cases have also been detected 
in the northern hemisphere during summer 
2017 than in previous waves. Nevertheless, 
there are some aspects that provide insights 
into the possible course of the epizootic (see 
Table 1). 
Figure 1b
H5N8 HPAI outbreaks officially reported in Asia, Middle East, Europe and Africa by onset 
date and bird type affected (domestic or wild), in January 2017
Figure 1c
H5N8 HPAI outbreaks officially reported in Asia, Middle East, Europe and Africa by onset 
date and bird type affected (domestic or wild), between 1 February and 30 June 2017
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Briefly, the first intercontinental wave in 
2005–2006 caused by a clade 2.2 H5N1 HPAI 
virus involved over 20 European countries, 
11 of which experienced cases in poultry. In 
this wave, the virus first arrived in Europe 
in October 2005, with cases of infection in 
Romania and Croatia, after others were found 
across the southern parts of the Russian 
Federation and Central Asia. In 2006, there 
were cases in a range of countries in north-
ern and southern Europe, the Middle East as 
well as North and West Africa. Movement of 
the virus across Europe in 2006 appeared to 
be correlated to the cold weather front, pre-
sumably as a result of wild bird movements 
(Sims and Brown, 2016). 
The virus associated with this first wave 
appeared to be virulent for some wild bird 
species and lethal infection was reported at 
that time in a large number of wild birds from 
a range of species. Asymptomatic infection 
was produced in several wild duck species 
experimentally infected with clade 2.2 H5N1 
virus demonstrating that healthy infected 
birds could play a role in the long distance 
spread of the virus (Gaidet et al., 2010). The 
virus was detected in Europe until January 
2009 with cases of disease in poultry occur-
ring from 2005 to 2008, in West Africa until 
2008 and became endemic to Egypt where it 
continues to evolve. The virus also persisted 
and evolved in south Asia until 2011. In all 
places, few cases were detected during the 
northern hemisphere summer. 
Compared to the fourth wave, in which no 
human cases have been reported to date, 
multiple human Influenza A(H5N1) cas-
es were detected in South-east Asia, the 
Middle East, Transcaucasia and Africa dur-
ing wave one. 
More wild bird deaths and poultry cas-
es were recorded during the fourth inter-
continental wave in the fall and winter of 
2016–2017 than for the same period during 
2005–2006 in the first intercontinental wave, 
although a considerable number of cases 
occurred in smallholdings across southern 
Russia and in Turkey in 2005–2006.
Table 1
Comparison of the four Gs/GD/96-lineage H5 HPAI intercontinental waves
Wave 1   2005 Wave 2    2009 Wave 3a   2014 Wave 3b    2014 Wave 4    2016 
Clade of virus 
involved 
Clade 2.2 (H5N1)  
and derivatives
Clade 2.3.2.1c  
(H5N1)
Clade 2.3.4.4  
(H5N8, H5N2, H5N1)
Clade 2.3.2.1 
”c” (H5N1)
Clade 2.3.4.4 (H5N8, 
H5N5, (H5N2?)
Origin of genes
Other H5 viruses 
(related to clade  
2.5,9).
Other H5 viruses Other H5 viruses
HA Buan-like  
(“A” sublineage)
Reassortment in 
North American 
isolates with viruses 
obtaining North 
American wild bird 
influenza viruses
Evolution of clade 
2.3.2.1c strains
HA Gochang-like  
(“B” sublineage) 
initially detected 
in Eastern China.  
Considerable 
reassortment with 
novel genes from 
Eurasian wild bird 
influenza viruses 
Mammalian markers PB2 E627K
Human infections Yes No No No No
Presence in Western  
China before  
intercontinental  
(I/C) spread
Qinghai May 2005 
(last detection 2007)
Qinghai May 2009
(last detection 2007)
Precursor viruses 
were detected in 
eastern China
No Qinghai May 2016 
Presence in southern 
Russia reported 
before I/C spread
Yes multiple locations Yes No OIE report of virus in 
southern Russia
Yes Tyva Reublic
Presence in NE 
Russia reported  
before I/C spread
No report No report No report No report No report
Widespread in Rep.  
of  Korea in spring,  
prior to I/C spread
No No No No No (several isolates 
detected in early 2014 
but  disappeared)
Areas affected
China, Mongolia, 
Russia, Central Asia 
Europe (widespread), 
Transcaucasus, 
Middle East 
West Africa  Japan 
Republic of Korea
China, Mongolia, 
Russia, Romania 
Bulgaria Nepal, 
Japan Republic of 
Korea
South Korea, Japan, 
Russia, Western 
Europe (Germany, 
England Netherlands 
Italy Hungary)
Russia, China, Middle 
East, West Africa, 
Cameroon, Romania, 
Bulgaria, Central Asia
China, Russian 
Federation, Central 
Asia, Middle East, 
Transcaucasus,  
Europe (widespread), 
South Asia, West 
Central,East, 
Southern Africa,  
Rep. of Korea
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The second intercontinental wave in 2009–
2010 was mild in comparison to the other 
waves. The clade 2.3.2.1c H5N1 HPAI virus 
involved was found as far west as Romania 
and Bulgaria but not detected on the African 
continent. It was also found in Nepal in 2010. 
This particular strain of virus did not persist 
outside of Asia and no clinical human cases 
were detected. 
The third intercontinental wave in 2014–
2015 involved two separate viral lineages 
and for convenience has been divided into 
waves 3a and 3b. Intercontinental wave 3a 
involved a clade 2.3.4.4 H5N8 HPAI virus, (re-
lated to, but clearly different from the 2016– 
2017 H5N8 HPAI virus), that was circulating 
in the Republic of Korea at the time of the 
2014 spring migration. It was subsequently 
found in the far north-eastern part of the 
Russian Federation in September 2014. In 
the following winter season, (late 2014), it 
was detected in northern Europe in Germany, 
the Netherlands, England and Italy and 
subsequently in Hungary in February 2015. 
Events in this wave have been compared pre-
viously to those in the first intercontinental 
wave (Adlhoch et al., 2014). It was conclud-
ed that efficient biosecurity, early detection, 
and stringent control measures were able to 
minimize the risks to poultry. The distribu-
tion of cases differed from that seen in the 
first wave, with cases first reported in north-
ern Europe and subsequently in Eastern 
Europe. The Netherlands reported incursion 
of Gs/GD/96-lineage virus for the first time 
during this wave. This virus did not persist in 
Europe. An important feature was the appar-
ent asymptomatic infection in wild birds with 
the virus rarely being detected in birds that 
were found dead.
At the same time, a similar H5N8 HPAI 
virus also travelled to North America and 
reassorted with North American wild bird in-
fluenza viruses to produce H5N1 and H5N2 
HPAI viruses. The H5N2 virus caused an out-
break in western Canada before the massive 
epizootic in the upper Midwest of the United 
States of America in 2015, the last case was 
in July 2015. In this intercontinental wave the 
proportion of large-scale commercial farms 
affected appeared to be greater than in the 
other waves, although it is not yet clear 
whether this was due to particular charac-
teristics of the virus.
In 2016–2017 only two clade 2.3.4.4 
H5N2 HPAI viruses have been detected in 
North America, both in wild mallard ducks 
in Alaska in August 2016 (Lee, Torchetti et 
al., 2017) and in December in Montana (OIE, 
2017a). The detection in apparently healthy 
migratory ducks provided a timely warning 
to the poultry sector there to implement ef-
fective biosecurity measures. The findings 
indicate that the virus can persist in wild 
bird populations, or the environment fre-
quented by wild birds, for several years even 
in the absence of further reports of poultry 
cases. The virus detected in a wild mallard 
in Alaska showed evidence of evolution (Lee, 
Torchetti et al., 2017) indicating multipli-
cation in avian hosts rather than just envi-
ronmental persistence of an earlier strain. 
These findings suggest there was only one 
period of introduction of Gs/GD/96-lineage 
H5 virus into North America after consid-
erable H5N8 replication in the Republic of 
Korea, the parent virus, at the time of the 
2014 spring migration. 
The possibility exists of invasion of North 
America in the future by different Gs/GD/96-
lineage H5 virus strains via the Behring Strait, 
Figure 2
Risk map demonstrating areas in sub-Saharan Africa suitable for sustained transmission 
of Gs/GD/96-lineage H5 HPAI once the virus is introduced to the area.  
especially if spring migration brings a novel 
H5 virus to the far north-eastern parts of the 
Russian Federation. Events in the Republic of 
Korea with the clade 2.3.4.4 H5N6 and H5N8 
virus since December 2016 warrant close ob-
servation. If either virus travels with migra-
tory birds further north to the eastern part 
of the Russian Federation, movement across 
the Bering Strait to North America remains a 
possibility.
Intercontinental wave 3b involved a H5N1 
HPAI clade 2.3.2.1c virus that differed from 
the 2009 isolate. It was found in the south-
ern part of the Russian Federation in the 
spring of 2014, thereafter being detected 
in the Middle East and next in West Africa 
before being found in Eastern Europe and 
India. This virus was still causing out-
breaks of disease in the Middle East in 
2016, (FAO, 2016b), and remains endemic 
to Nigeria with outbreaks reported in five 
West African countries, as occurred with 
the first wave. The virus also spread to 
Cameroon in Central Africa producing dis-
ease in poultry. 
Source: Adapted from Dhingra et al., 2016, suitability index ranging from 0: not suitable to 1: highly suitable.
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Likely progress of the current  
H5 epizootic
By May 2017 case numbers in Europe were 
falling but some new cases were still being 
detected during the northern autumn and 
summer, e.g. eastern Sweden, a backyard 
flock in Norwich, England, Finland, Belgium, 
Luxembourg, Italy, parts of the Russian 
Federation and Turkey. Case numbers in 
poultry are expected to rise again in late 2017. 
Cases could recur on the Tibetan plateau, at 
Lake Ubsu-Nur and in Mongolia, although so 
far, there have been no reports of a return of 
the virus to these areas. Other African coun-
tries, in addition to Cameroon, Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Niger, Nigeria, 
Tunisia, Uganda, Zimbabwe and South Africa, 
could be affected. It is not yet clear how the 
outbreak in southern Africa will evolve. A fea-
ture of the European epidemic was a large 
number of cases in backyard or smallhold-
ings of poultry, contrasting with previous ep-
idemic waves. This might reflect the extent 
of environmental contamination, presumably 
mediated via wild birds. Areas of high poultry 
density with extensive production systems for 
domestic waterfowl or production of domestic 
turkeys appear to be at high risk, especially in 
late 2017 and early 2018 if the pattern seen in 
the first intercontinental wave recurs. 
It is noteworthy that most H5 HPAI cases in 
poultry in this current fourth wave have oc-
curred in areas predicted as high-risk by the 
large-scale suitability model of Dhingra et al., 
(2016) and few in low-risk areas, including 
those with a large number of wild bird cases. 
The area around Lake Victoria in East Africa 
was also predicted as being a site with high 
suitability for transmission of H5 HPAI by the 
same model, extending into countries neigh-
bouring Uganda (Figure 2). 
The large number of wild bird cases in 
Europe, with known cases/deaths likely rep-
resenting only a small proportion of the total, 
may alter the patterns of this disease com-
pared to the past. The introduction of this 
virus to North America from Europe through 
overlapping Atlantic flyways remains a possi-
bility since other avian influenza viruses have 
used that pathway, but the risk is regarded as 
low.3 Gs/GD/96-lineage H5 HPAI viruses have 
not travelled to North America via this path-
way in the past.
Clade 2.3.4.4 H5N8 HPAI in South Asia
The clade 2.3.4.4 H5N8 HPAI virus that ap-
peared in October 2016 has not been detected 
recently in south Asia but may recur. This con-
clusion is based on experiences with other 
strains that have emerged there in the past, 
some of which have persisted for several 
years; see, for example, Marinova-Petkova et 
al.,2014) and the detection of a case in Nepal 
in March 2017, (OIE, 2017b). No new cases 
in poultry due to H5N8 HPAI virus have been 
identified in India since the last outbreak in 
Karnataka, detected on 24 November 2016, 
(OIE, 2017c). Cases in wild birds, including 
captive birds, were reported in December 
from Gujarat and Karnataka, zoological col-
lection. Other, more recent HPAI cases ap-
pear to be due to viruses of the H5N1 subtype 
from clade 2.3.2.1a, (OIE, 2017d).
 
Clade 2.3.4.4 H5N8 virus in Egypt
Detection of the H5N8 virus in Egypt is of 
concern since it is very likely this will further 
complicate control of H5N1 HPAI there. H5N1 
HPAI virus of clade 2.2.1.2 and its earlier rel-
atives have been entrenched in Egypt since 
the first intercontinental wave in 2005–2006. 
The H5N8 strain is antigenically distant from 
vaccine strains currently used to assist in the 
control of this disease in Egypt’s commercial 
sector and this may result in an increase in 
outbreaks and accelerated virus spread if it 
becomes established in poultry. In addition, 
the presence of two distinct strains will make 
laboratory detection more complex although 
options using clade-specific rapid diagnos-
tic tools exist and have been used (Naguib 
et al., 2017). As of June 2017 multiple cas-
es have been reported in poultry in the Nile 
Delta (OIE, 2017e) and some have extended 
to Upper Egypt, suggesting the virus is like-
ly to become widespread in poultry in this 
area with a potential spread to other parts of 
Egypt. Reassortment of genes between the 
H5N8 virus and the pre-existing H5N1 viruses 
and/or H9N2 viruses is possible. 
Clade 2.3.4.4 H5N8 in West Africa
In two previous intercontinental waves, the 
first in 2005–2016 and third, 3b, in 2014–2015, 
initial cases in West Africa were detected in 
Nigeria during the northern winter. Available 
spatial, temporal and genetic evidence sug-
gests wild birds as the source for each of these 
incursions, previously suggested by Cecchi et 
al., 2008), although never proven. Some have 
theorized that H5N1 viruses in 2005–2006 were 
introduced via trade but the repeated pattern 
In 2016/17, many dead aquatic birds tested positive for H5N8 HPAI virus 
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3 See Dusek et al., 2014 for information on movement 
of other avian influenza viruses via these flyways.
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of incursions by viruses detected elsewhere in 
wild birds suggests the wild bird route is more 
plausible. Nigeria has a large number of win-
tering Eurasian migratory ducks, African wild 
nomadic ducks, and a poultry industry in areas 
where direct or indirect contact between wild 
birds and poultry can occur. As of May 2017, 
the only known cases of H5N8 avian influen-
za in Nigeria were in Kano State (OIE, 2017f). 
Niger has also reported cases in the west of 
the country (OIE, 2017g). Other West African 
countries are also at risk of H5 virus incursion 
based on previous experiences. In addition, the 
H5N8 virus has been detected in Cameroon 
(FAO, 2017) in the area where Gs/GD/96-like 
H5N1 HPAI virus was first detected in the north 
of the country in 2006. Reassortment between 
H5N1 virus already circulating in West Africa 
and the H5N8 virus introduced in 2016–2017 
could occur.
Clade 2.3.4.4 H5N8 in Uganda and  
southern Africa
The fourth intercontinental wave is the first to 
spread as far south as the equatorial region in 
Africa and beyond, other than a single case in 
southern Sudan in 2006. When the outbreak in 
Uganda occurred, the expectation was that the 
virus had the potential to be a major econom-
ic and social disaster for poultry owners. The 
vast majority of poultry in Uganda are in small 
household flocks, (FAO, 2008), and represent 
an important source of livelihoods and income. 
As of May 2017, the virus had only been 
detected in one other district, Budaka, in 
Uganda other than those adjacent to Lake 
Victoria: Kalangala, Masaka and Wakiso 
Districts. Expansion to three other coun-
tries, Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(OIE, 2017h), South Africa (OIE, 2017i) and 
Zimbabwe (OIE, 2017j), has occurred. The fu-
ture course of this outbreak in central, east-
ern and southern Africa remains uncertain.4 
Timely reporting of poultry deaths in many 
African countries is weak and, as with other 
Gs/GD/96-lineage viruses, not all infected 
domestic ducks show signs of disease. These 
two factors can reduce the effectiveness of 
programmes aimed at detecting cases, con-
trolling the spread of the virus and its elimi-
nation. It is possible that the virus may persist 
in Uganda and elsewhere in central, eastern 
and southern Africa for some time if new cas-
es are not detected or detected late. 
4 For updates see FAO EMPRES http://www.fao.org/
ag/againfo/programmes/en/empres/HPAI_Africa/
situation_update.html
Spillover of the virus to captive bird collections 
and zoos has occurred in several countries
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Clade 2.3.4.4 H5N8/H5N6/H5N5 in wild 
birds, including captive collections
For wild birds, the 2016–17 clade 2.3.4.4 H5Nx 
HPAI viruses were mostly detected in dead 
birds via passive monitoring. Initially the ma-
jority of infections were reported from div-
ing duck species such as tufted duck (Aythya 
fuligula), greater scaups (Aythya marila) or 
common pochards (Aythya farina). Other 
Anseriform species, swans, geese, but rare-
ly dabbling ducks and species from other 
waterbird families such as gulls, terns, coots, 
curlews, cormorants and grebes, were also 
infected. Some infected birds of prey, such as 
common buzzards (Buteo buteo) and white-
tailed eagles (Haliaeetus albicilla), were found 
dead near water bodies at sites frequented 
by migratory birds and presumably exposed 
through feeding on infected prey. Raptor spe-
cies affected in Europe are recorded in detail 
elsewhere (APHA, 2017; FAO, 2017). The main 
species affected in Uganda were white winged 
terns, Chlidonias leucopterus, a Eurasian 
migratory waterbird species that winter in 
sub-Saharan Africa. 
Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands 
and Denmark, in particular, detected the 
virus in numerous wild birds in multiple re-
gions, initially mainly at sites frequented by 
migratory Anatidae. Cases occurred both in 
north (the Baltic Sea area) and central Europe 
(Lake Constance and Lake Geneva area), and 
new cases continue to occur. Cases have ex-
tended to places where Gs/GD/96-lineage 
H5 HPAI virus had not been seen previous-
ly, including Ireland, Portugal, Tunisia and 
Uganda. In the early stages of the outbreak 
in Europe, several large scale die offs in div-
ing ducks occurred–whereas later in the 
outbreak only single cases were reported in 
other species and, in more recent outbreaks, 
also in diving ducks. 
It is likely that certain avian species are 
more susceptible than others to these H5N8 
viruses and their derivatives (H5N6/H5N5). 
Events in Europe indicate secondary spread 
amongst domestic Anseriformes with some 
affected populations of the same species 
showing variation in disease signs and overall 
mortality. The clinical spectrum in all species 
of domestic birds associated with these par-
ticular viruses is not fully characterised, al-
though to date, even in domestic ducks, the 
virus appears to be highly virulent and birds 
present with signs of disease. This may change 
as the virus becomes more adapted to domes-
tic waterfowl in particular.
At Lake Ubsu-Nur a number of the pos-
itive cases were from potentially healthy 
hunter-killed birds – black-headed gull 
(Chroicocephalus ridibundus), great cormo-
rant (Phalacrocorax carbo) – while others were 
from dead birds - grey heron (Ardea cinerea), 
common tern (Sterna hirundo), great crested 
grebe (Podiceps cristatus) and black-headed 
gull (Chroicocephalus ridibundus). Some of 
these species could be acting as sentinels. 
Rather than focusing on live birds, surveillance 
in Europe has been centered around dead 
ones, due to greater sensitivity, and almost 
certainly did not detect all infected wild birds. 
H5N5 HPAI virus was detected through active 
surveillance in an apparently healthy common 
teal in Montenegro (OIE, 2017k). 
The virus in South Africa has been detected 
in resident and migratory wild birds includ-
ing Egyptian Goose (Alopochen aegyptiaca), 
two dead passerine birds (Southern masked 
weaver - Ploceus velatus) and in a dead yel-
low billed duck (Anas undulata). Their specif-
ic roles in transmission remains to be deter-
mined (OIE, 2017l).
Spillover of the virus to captive bird collec-
tions and zoos has occurred in at least eight 
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countries: Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany, 
India, the Russian Federation, Netherlands, 
Finland and Sweden, with one H5N8 case in 
a zoo in China also likely to be caused by a 
related virus. In several cases the infection 
occurred mainly in non-resident birds with 
spillover to captive birds. So far, in all but two 
cases in zoos, culling has been restricted to 
sick birds with other birds protected using a 
combination of measures including quarantine 
and enhanced hygiene. 
It is important to stress that no benefit is 
gained by scaring off wild birds, hunting them 
indiscriminately, or destroying their habitat. 
Spraying disinfectant on birds or the envi-
ronment is likewise counter-productive and 
harmful with potential long-term negative 
consequences to fauna, flora, agriculture and 
surface waterways. Furthermore, such actions 
are not recommended in good disease man-
agement practices. These activities will likely 
accelerate dispersal of potentially infected 
birds and hence, of the virus. There is also no 
justification for any pre-emptive culling of en-
dangered species in zoological collections (see 
Globig et al., 2016). 
Further adaptation of the virus to poul-
try may develop when expanding secondary 
spread in domestic poultry occurs, as was 
seen in the North American H5N2 outbreaks in 
2014–2015, (DeJesus et al., 2016). 
What is the main source of  
the H5N8 virus? 
Based on the temporal and recurrent spatial 
patterns of intercontinental outbreaks, it is 
now widely accepted that the dispersal of Gs/
GD/96-lineage virus from East Asia, observed 
in most intercontinental waves, is associated 
with wild bird movements. Phylogenetic data, 
at this stage of analysis for the current H5N8 
virus, essentially corroborates earlier obser-
vations (Global Consortium, 2016; Sims and 
Brown, 2016). It is reasonable to assume that 
the main birds involved were Anatidae given 
the current knowledge of the ecology of avian 
influenza in wild birds. 
Satellite telemetry studies of migratory 
ducks, geese and swans have found that indi-
vidual birds have the potential to disperse the 
virus as far as 1 500 km in only four days on av-
erage, assuming that infection does not reduce 
their movement capacities (Gaidet et al., 2010). 
A relay-like, stepping stone transmission pat-
tern, between a series of migratory birds suc-
cessively infected, probably allows these virus-
es to move considerable distances in a matter 
of weeks. Strains more likely to be transmitted 
over long distances are probably those best 
adapted to one or more host species and shed 
in relatively high quantities without producing 
severe disease in most infected birds. Once the 
virus arrives at stopover sites in a new wetland, 
other more vulnerable genera can be infected 
and bird die-offs can occur. This then provides 
opportunities for infection of carrion-eating 
birds scavenging on carcasses. 
The detection of virus across a wide area 
in a very short time suggests high levels 
of infection at a congregation site just pri-
or to movement of these birds into Europe. 
Weather conditions in late October 2016 in 
areas to the north-east of western Europe 
with sub-zero temperatures and snow, may 
have triggered movement of these birds. The 
time between September and November is 
a period of recurrent high infection rates of 
wild ducks with low pathogenic AI viruses in 
northern Europe (Latorre-Margalef et al., 
2014). Equivalent information on H5 HPAI 
viruses is not available but similar patterns 
could occur. Changes in weather patterns, 
especially the arrival of very cold weath-
er across Europe, as in the first weeks of 
January 2017, may have resulted in further 
movement of birds and the virus to warmer 
areas. Furthermore, with such a heavy in-
fection burden in wild birds, this will result 
in significant environmental contamination 
and, depending on climatic conditions, the 
virus may persist for many weeks in the 
environment in an infectious form, i.e. after 
wild bird populations have moved on. 
In a number of earlier intercontinental 
waves, the virus has also returned to Asia, 
with cases detected in the southern part 
of the Russian Federation in the following 
spring and, on two occasions, in the Republic 
of Korea and Japan in the following winter. 
The 2005–2006 wave was the only one so far 
that resulted in recurrent cases in Europe 
over several years with the virus persisting 
intermittently until 2008–2009. In interconti-
nental wave 3b the virus was detected in Iraq 
for several years. 
Other pathways for its introduction 
have been considered for each of the 
intercontinental waves, including trade in 
poultry and poultry products. With the ex-
ception of isolated cases involving trade in 
captive birds, not associated with these four 
waves, the pattern of outbreaks and the mo-
lecular evidence are consistent with wild bird 
introductions for most countries. Initial ob-
servations suggest wild bird introduction of 
H5N8 highly pathogenic avian influenza virus 
to Zimbabwe and South Africa, and its subse-
quent spread. More details on movement of 
wild birds, in particular Anatidae, just prior to 
these outbreaks will help to determine their 
role, especially given the apparent timing of 
introduction to these two countries did not 
match the spatio-temporal pattern of long 
distance migrants. 
Genetic analysis of the 2016–17 
H5Nx HPAI virus strains
The viruses involved in the fourth intercon-
tinental wave form part of a clearly distin-
guishable sublineage to the ones found in 
Europe in 2014. There is as yet no official 
nomenclature for this sublineage but some 
scientific papers refer to them as 2.3.4.4 
“Group B” or “Gochang-like”, (see for exam-
ple Lee, Sharshov et al., 2017; EFSA, 2016). 
This sublineage was first detected in birds 
in China in 2010: A/duck/Jiangsu1203/2010-
like viruses. It reached the Korean peninsula 
in the winter of 2013–2014 but was not the 
dominant strain that year (Kim et al., 2017); 
another sublineage of H5N8 virus, referred to 
as 2.3.4.4 ”Group A” or “Buan-like”, became 
established. This “Group A” virus was the 
sublineage detected in Europe and a number 
of Asian countries later in 2014 in interconti-
nental wave 3a. 
Figure 3 shows that the Tyva Republic vi-
ruses along with those found subsequently in 
Europe in 2016–2017 are readily distinguisha-
ble from those H5N8 HPAI viruses (“Group A”) 
detected in Europe and North America (light 
brown shading) during the previous wave in 
2014–2015. Figure 3 also demonstrates that 
the H5N6 viruses from the Republic of Korea 
and Japan (yellow shading) in 2016–2017 fall 
into another sub-lineage within clade 2.3.4.4. 
Detailed information on gene sequenc-
es for the H5N8 HPAI viruses from the Tyva 
Republic have been published (Lee, Sharshov 
et al., 2017) confirming that the virus was a 
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reassortant form possessing 3 genes (HA, NA, 
and NS) similar to earlier H5N8 viruses with-
in clade 2.3.4.4 ”Group B” (“Gochang-like” vi-
ruses). The other five genes identified derived 
from wild bird origin low pathogenic influen-
za viruses. Virus in this group had remained 
unreported since originally detected in China 
and the Republic of Korea during 2014 (Lee, 
Sharshov et al., 2017) until it was report-
ed again in Qinghai and the Tyva Republic in 
May-June 2016.
Other related H5N8 viruses (“Group B”) 
were found in wild birds in China in 2013 
(Zhou et al., 2016) and it is not yet clear why it 
has taken several years for this strain to un-
dertake long distance intercontinental move-
ment despite being detected in some birds in 
the Republic of Korea in 2014. The acquisition 
of internal genes from wild bird avian influ-
enza viruses may be a factor. 
Gene sequences from the isolates from 
Germany demonstrate that the 2016–2017 
virus (“Group B”) there had acquired two new 
genome segments (PA and NP) from wild bird 
influenza viruses and had a truncated NS1 pro-
tein (Pohlmann et al., 2017). The significance 
of these changes is yet to be determined.
Assessment of gene sequences from 2016–
2017 “Group B” viruses in Europe indicates 
that they form a monophyletic group de-
rived from a common ancestor (EFSA, 2016) 
but demonstrates some minor differences 
suggesting virus introductions by slightly 
Figure 3
Partial phylogenetic tree of clade 2.3.4.4 s/GD/96-lineage H5 viruses demonstrating the relationship between “Group A” (“Buan-like”) and 
“Group B” (“Gochang-like”) sublineages. The H5N6 viruses from East Asia in 2016-2017 are also highlighted.
Source: Adapted from WHO, 2017. Antigenic and genetic characteristics of zoonotic influenza viruses and development of candidate vaccine viruses for pandemic preparedness. March.
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different pathways or flyways (APHA, 2017). 
Viruses from India are also closely related re-
assortant viruses (Nagarajan et al., 2017) as 
are those from the Republic of Korea (Lee et 
al., 2017c). 
The possibility exists that these “Group 
B” viruses are shed by wild birds in high 
concentrations in faeces which may partly 
account for the apparently increased trans-
missibility of these wild bird isolates (EFSA, 
2016). Many of the earlier Gs/GD/96-lineage 
H5 viruses are shed in larger quantities via 
the oropharynx. A 2014 “Group A” H5N8 vi-
rus from the Republic of Korea was shed 
in greater quantities in experimentally in-
fected mandarin ducks than H5N1 viruses 
detected there earlier (Kang et al., 2017). 
These “Group A” viruses appear to have a 
tropism for both respiratory and enteric 
tracts but do not seem to have preferential 
replication in one or other site compared to 
earlier Gs/GD/96-lineage H5 viruses. This 
work needs to be repeated for the “Group 
B” viruses.
Other reassortants
On 14 December 2016 the Netherlands re-
ported an H5N5 virus from a dead wild bird. 
This virus presumably arose through reas-
sortment between the “Group B” H5N8 virus 
and a wild bird HxN5 virus. Other very sim-
ilar H5N5 viruses have subsequently been 
detected in 10 other countries and were as-
sociated with some outbreaks in poultry. An 
H5N6 reassortant virus has been detected in 
Greece. 
Clade 2.3.4.4 H5N6 virus in the 
Republic of Korea and Japan 
At about the time the H5N8 virus was de-
tected in Europe, the Korean Peninsula and 
Japan once again reported the introduction 
of a Gs/GD/96-lineage H5 virus. This was a 
clade 2.3.4.4 virus of the H5N6 subtype (see 
Figure 3). This followed earlier incursions of 
Gs/GD/96-lineage H5 HPAI viruses in 2003–
2004, 2006–2007, 2008 (spring), 2010–2011 
and 2014–2015 – each time with a novel 
strain of virus that was, however, already cir-
culating in the wider region. H5N6 HPAI virus 
has been the dominant strain circulating in 
mainland east and south-east Asia for the 
past four years (Bi et al., 2016). It appears 
that, in line with past incursions, supported 
by documented wild duck movements and 
phylogenetic analyses, (Cappelle et al., 2014; 
Hill et al., 2015), wild birds introduced it to 
the Republic of Korea and Japan. This H5N6 
HPAI virus is the seventh novel Gs/GD/96-
lineage virus detected in these two countries. 
The detection by Korean researchers of an 
H5N6 virus in faeces from wild birds gave a 
warning to poultry farmers there and in Japan 
to enhance biosecurity. However, this did not 
prevent widespread infection in the Republic 
of Korea where the outbreak has now exceed-
ed that of 2014–2015 in terms of number of 
cases and total birds killed or destroyed. 
Information on the genetics of these viruses 
has been published (Si et al., 2017; Lee, Song 
et al., 2017). The HA and NA genes of this virus 
are similar to those from a dead great egret 
found on 2 January 2016 in Hong Kong SAR, 
China. The virus appears to be a reassortant, 
obtaining other genes from the wild bird in-
fluenza virus gene pool. Korean H5N6 viruses 
are similar to those detected in Guangdong 
province, China in early 2016. They could be 
divided into five genotypes based on their in-
ternal protein gene constellations. Several 
viruses acquired PA genes from the Eurasian 
wild bird influenza gene pool.
Japan detected over 170 virus positive cas-
es among dead wild birds by mid-January 
2017, but only eight farms had reported dis-
ease in poultry associated with this virus at 
that time. By early February this number had 
increased to 10 farms. 
H5N6 HPAI virus is already widespread in 
poultry in China and Viet Nam and cases have 
been detected in the Lao People's Democratic 
Republic and Myanmar. It was the predomi-
nant strain found in national surveillance pro-
grammes in poultry in the first half of 2016 
in China (MoA China, 2016). This virus could 
travel to North America if migratory birds 
carry it to far eastern parts of the Russian 
Federation during spring migrations.
It is not clear why H5N6 viruses have not 
travelled previously to the Korean Peninsula 
and Japan given that they have been the dom-
inant strain in Chinese poultry for a number 
of years. Perhaps this indicates strains that 
move via wild birds need to be well adapted to 
them while those in domestic chickens may 
not necessarily have this characteristic. We 
await experimental studies on these viruses 
in different hosts. The genetic reassortment 
that has occurred in these viruses may also 
be significant (Lee, Song et al., 2017 ). 
From February 2017 onwards outbreaks of 
H5N8 HPAI virus were also detected in poultry 
in the Republic of Korea. These were caused 
by “Group B” lineage viruses and represent 
new introductions of the virus (see above).  
H5 HPAI threats elsewhere  
(clade 2.3.4.4 and other) 
A number of countries are still infected en-
demically with Gs/GD-lineage H5 viruses 
that could spread from there to other coun-
tries. These include the clade 2.3.2.1c H5N1 
HPAI strains from the fourth intercontinental 
wave that are still circulating in West Africa. 
Similar viruses were also detected in Iran 
(2015), Iraq and Lebanon (2016), (FAO, 2016b). 
Clade 2.3.2.1a viruses continue to circulate 
and cause disease in south Asia. 
Egypt is still infected with derivatives of 
clade 2.2 (2.2.1.2) H5N1 HPAI virus from the 
first intercontinental wave in 2005–2006. 
Spillover of these viruses has occurred to oth-
er neighbouring countries in the past includ-
ing Israel, Gaza and the West Bank and Libya 
although the pathways of transmission may 
include poultry or poultry products in some of 
these cases.
Various Gs/GD/96-lineage H5 viruses con-
tinue to circulate in mainland east and south-
east Asia, including clade 2.3.4.4 viruses, 
mainly H5N6 HPAI, and clade 2.3.2.1c H5N1 
HPAI viruses. Several isolates of an H5N9 
HPAI virus have been reported. One of these 
H5N8 HPAI viruses are shed by wild birds into 
the environment 
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was a reassortant between an H5 HPAI and 
H7N9 virus in China and this development 
needs to be monitored closely given the high 
pathogenicity of both parent strains in hu-
mans (Yu et al., 2015). Variant clade 2.3.2.1 
viruses, with one referred to unofficially as 
clade 2.3.2.1e, have also been detected in 
wild birds in China in 2015 (Jiang et al., 2017). 
These viruses are antigenic variants and so 
have the capacity to resist vaccine-derived 
immunity or naturally acquired immune re-
sponses from exposure to other H5 viruses in 
farmed and wild birds. Antigenic variation is 
likely to be an important factor in determining 
the extent of infection and viral shedding in 
infected wild birds. 
Conclusions and future 
perspectives 
Broad patterns and observations have emerged that may be helpful in fore-
casting future intercontinental movement of 
Gs/GD/96—lineage H5 HPAI viruses and the 
course of epizootics. In particular, these are: 
i. The detection of a novel strain of 
Gs/GD/96-lineage H5 HPAI virus in the 
southern Russian Federation in the spring 
or early summer, which may be preceded 
or accompanied by reports of a similar vi-
rus on the Tibetan plateau or in Mongolia, 
preceded movement of the virus and infec-
tion of poultry in Europe, the Middle East 
and, in some cases, Africa
ii. The presence of Gs/GD/96-lineage H5 
virus during the spring migration in the 
Korean peninsula and/or Japan and later, 
detection of a virus in the far north-eastern 
part of the Russian Federation, preceded 
movement of H5 virus to Europe and North 
America in 2014. Although this pattern 
has only occurred once, it warrants close 
monitoring to see if it is repeated. There 
were new cases of H5N8 HPAI virus in 
early June 2017 in the Republic of Korea. 
We await information from the far eastern 
region of the Russian Federation to see if 
this, or the H5N6 virus, is detected there 
following the northern hemisphere spring 
migration in 2017.
iii. Emergence of novel strains of Gs/GD/ 
96-lineage H5 HPAI virus in eastern China, 
especially those detected in wild birds, 
could provide warning of possible spread 
to the Korean peninsula, as occurred in 
2014 and 2016. All novel strains need to 
be monitored closely, including full ge-
nome sequencing, to establish whether 
they have acquired genes from wild bird 
influenza viruses which may facilitate viral 
carriage by wild birds over long distances.
iv. Apparently no strain of Gs/GD/96-lineage 
H5 HPAI virus has had continuous or 
semi-continuous infection cycles involving 
wild birds for longer than three years, al-
though repeated spillover from poultry in 
places where certain strains become en-
demic is possible. It is noteworthy there 
is no record of northward long distance 
transmission of Gs/GD/96-lineage H5 vi-
rus from Egypt or West Africa by migra-
tory birds despite the virus being either 
endemic or present there for a number of 
years.
v. Based on the experience of the first inter-
continental wave during which considera-
ble infection in wild birds occurred, there 
is a possibility of a multi-year epizootic 
in Europe and Africa with the 2016–2017 
H5N8 virus. The evidence available so far 
suggests considerable infection in the wild 
bird population for the current, fourth, in-
tercontinental wave of infection.
We cannot predict the severity of interconti-
nental outbreaks or their exact patterns, both 
temporal and spatial, but as more informa-
tion becomes available on the species of birds 
involved in long distance carriage and the 
characteristics of the viruses it may be pos-
sible to issue more precise forecasts. Greater 
integration of information on the ground from 
ornithological groups about movements of 
Anatidae in real time would be extremely 
helpful. For example, was there an increase 
in the number of migratory ducks in northern 
Germany just prior to the outbreaks in late 
2016, or changes in the composition of the 
migratory duck community? 
The role weather plays in such patterns 
needs further investigation. It has already 
been demonstrated in the first wave in Europe 
that there was some correlation with the zero 
degree isotherm and movement of the virus 
related to wild bird movements (Ottaviani et 
al., 2010; Reperant et al., 2010). Movement 
patterns of Anatidae could also be affected 
and even modified by atypical climatic con-
ditions, such as the prolonged high Arctic 
temperatures and freezing temperatures over 
the northern part of the Russian Federation 
in the winter of 2016–2017. Changes such as 
these may alter patterns of spread and trans-
mission for Gs/GD/96-lineage H5 HPAI and 
other avian influenza viruses in the future. 
So far all of the H5 HPAI viruses involved 
in intercontinental movement were first de-
tected, and likely evolved, in east Asia. All 
belong to the so-called Gs/GD/96-lineage, or 
at least their HA gene does. Current farming 
systems, especially in southern and eastern 
China, in which domestic ducks and wild 
birds share ecosystems, provide ample op-
portunities for generation of novel strains of 
H5 virus within this lineage. This pattern of 
emergence of new strains and their spread 
to other countries every few years is expect-
ed to continue until such time as the virus is 
contained in domestic ducks. This production 
system is now also being used in north-east 
China. 
There are many reasons why the control 
and prevention of H5 HPAI in these produc-
tion systems have proved to be difficult (FAO, 
2011). The measures applied for the past 19 
years have not prevented emergence of new 
H5 HPAI viruses within the Gs/GD/96-lineage. 
Therefore, unless novel, alternative control 
and preventive strategies are devised and 
implemented, new strains will continue to 
emerge and spread globally. Elimination of 
Gs/GD/96-lineage H5 viruses is still regarded 
as highly unlikely. Too many factors prevent 
virus elimination (FAO, 2011), including, but 
not limited to, the nature of production and 
marketing systems.
There is little likelihood of significant 
changes to duck production systems in the 
short term. China is home to a standing pop-
ulation of some 800 million ducks with most 
reared outdoors on ponds and/or rice paddy 
fields. Some have made calls for a shift back 
to aggressive stamping out. But even if adopt-
ed, this approach is highly unlikely to be suc-
cessful given the difficulties in detecting all 
infected duck flocks, especially when many 
show no signs of infection and the high risk 
of re-infection following such measures if 
production systems remain the same. There 
is a need to apply alternative control methods 
especially as the available evidence suggests 
that once the virus is eliminated from poultry 
it will likely also disappear from wild birds 
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within a few years, as occurred in the past 
following each intercontinental wave. 
Since 2004, FAO has recommended assess-
ment of all available measures for control 
and prevention of HPAI, including vaccina-
tion, by countries or regions at risk or those 
which have repeated virus incursions. Each 
country or region should make decisions on 
the strategic use of the suite of measures 
available based on consideration of local fac-
tors, including the frequency of outbreaks/
incursions, public health, the nature of the 
poultry sector and a cost-benefit analysis of 
the various measures.
Alternative measures may also be necessary 
in places where extensive production systems 
with high population density favour introduc-
tion and transmission of the virus, especially 
where it is not possible to enhance biosecurity. 
Finally, the capacity to make even mod-
est predictions depends on information from 
surveillance systems in the places described 
above with early reporting of results to the 
global community, including genetic data on 
isolates. FAO commends those veterinary au-
thorities that have shared information on cas-
es and gene sequences of viruses in a rapid 
and timely manner. 
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The Emergency Prevention System (EMPRES) is an FAO programme, founded in 1994, with the goal of 
enhancing world food security, fighting transboundary animal and plant pests and diseases and reducing 
the adverse impact of food safety threats. EMPRES-Animal Health is the component dealing with the 
prevention and control of transboundary animal diseases (TADs).
To subscribe or to ask for information about EMPRES-Animal Health send an e-mail to
empres-animal-health@fao.org or a fax to (+39) 06 57053023.
For more information visit us at http://www.fao.org/ag/empres.html
EMPRES-Animal Health can assist countries in the shipment of samples for TAD diagnostic testing at a 
FAO reference laboratory and reference centre. Please contact empres-shipping-service@fao.org for 
information prior to sampling or shipment. Please note that sending samples out of a country requires an 
export permit from the Chief Veterinarian’s Office of the country and an import permit from the receiving 
country.
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